Game Theory (ECON 159) In the first half of the lecture, we consider the chain-s...
Game Theory (ECON 159) We develop a simple model of bargaining, starting from an...
Game Theory (ECON 159) In the first half of the lecture, we consider the chain-s...
Game Theory (ECON 159) We first discuss Zermelo's theorem: that games like tic-t...
Game Theory (ECON 159) We first apply our big idea--backward induction--to analy...
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Views: (1010) Date: (21-04-10) Time: (01:12:39) |
Description: Game Theory (ECON 159) We first discuss Zermelo's theorem: that games like tic-tac-toe or chess have a solution. That is, either there is a way for player 1 to force a win, or there is a way for player 1 to force a tie, or there is a way for player 2 to force a win. The proof is by induction. Then we formally define and informally discuss both perfect information and strategies in such games. This allows us to find Nash equilibria in sequential games. But we find that some Nash equilibria are inconsistent with backward induction. In particular, we discuss an example that involves a threat that is believed in an equilibrium but does not seem credible. Complete course materials are available at the Open Yale Courses website: open.yale.edu This course was recorded in Fall 2007.